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HEAVENLY FREEDOM AND TWO MODELS OF
CHARACTER PERFECTION
Robert J. Hartman

Human persons can act with libertarian freedom in heaven according to one
prominent view, because they have freely acquired perfect virtue in their
pre-heavenly lives such that acting rightly in heaven is volitionally necessary.
But since the character of human persons is not perfect at death, how is their
character perfected? On the unilateral model, God alone completes the perfection of their character, and, on the cooperative model, God continues to work
with them in purgatory to perfect their own character. I argue that although both
models can make sense of all human persons enjoying free will in heaven on various assumptions, the cooperative model allows all human persons in heaven to
enjoy a greater degree of freedom. This consideration about the degree of heavenly freedom provides a reason for God to implement the cooperative model.

According to a prominent family of libertarian views, a person acts
directly freely if and only if the action was not causally determined, she
had alternative possibilities at the moment of choice, she had the power
to choose between those alternatives, and she chose in virtue of exercising that power. Such freedom is what Alvin Plantinga calls “morally
significant” if and only if at least one choice alternative is morally right
and at least one is morally wrong.1 The value of morally significant freedom lies at least in the way in which it enables a person to have great
autonomy with respect to making morally right and wrong choices, to be
seriously morally praiseworthy and blameworthy, to create her own morally good and bad character in substantial ways, and to make a difference
to the moral goodness and badness of the world in important respects.2

Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 166.
See, for example, Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will, 81–89; Katherine Rogers,
Freedom and Self-Creation, 20–25; Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 82–110.
The modifiers “great,” “serious,” “substantial,” and “important” are meant to highlight that
it is possible to have these properties in ways that are small, non-serious, insubstantial, and
far less important via a kind of direct freedom that is not morally significant in Plantinga’s
sense. See footnote 42.
1
2
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Many theists appeal to the great value of morally significant freedom as
at least a partial explanation for why a perfectly good and omnipotent
God allows evil to occur in creation—namely, God’s goodness leads God
to give morally significant freedom to human beings but they have misused this gift.3
The value of morally significant freedom and its use in explaining why
God allows evil, however, become puzzling in view of heaven. Heaven is
a place or state in which it is impossible to do wrong, and thus no one in
heaven has morally significant freedom.4 But heaven is also the best possible place or state for human beings. So, if morally significant freedom is
such a great good, why does heaven preclude it?5
A plausible response to this puzzle is that human persons can have
a kind of free will in heaven with value inherited from pre-heavenly
morally significant free actions.6 Roughly, the idea is that persons
can enjoy a kind of free will in heaven if (i) their heavenly character
necessitates their choosing in accordance with the right and the good,7
(ii) they are morally responsible for having formed that character via
pre-heavenly free actions and omissions in a foreseeable way, and (iii)
those previous free actions and omissions involved a choice range
between morally right and wrong alternatives. So then, because persons in heaven have used their morally significant freedom in the past
to form the source of their heavenly actions—namely, their perfected

3
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 166; Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil,
82–110.
4
Benjamin Matheson suggests that persons in heaven do have morally significant freedom. After all, the devil was an angel in heaven who did wrong (see Revelation 12:7–9; Luke
10:18), which implies that it is possible for some persons in heaven to do wrong. So, why not
human persons too (see “Tracing and Heavenly Freedom,” 65–67)? The short answer is that
although there is morally significant freedom for angels in heaven, the good afterlife for resurrected human persons does not take place in heaven but on the new earth—a place where
there is no more “mourning,” “death,” or “pain” for such things have “passed away,” which
presumably also includes the possibility of wrongdoing (Revelation 21:1–5). There is also a
corresponding “new heaven” that presumably differs from the old such that angels in the
new heaven can no longer do wrong (Revelation 21:1). Thus, Matheson’s question is elicited
by a confusion about the conventional use of “heaven” to refer to what the Bible names the
“new heaven and earth,” which is a separate state from the one in which the devil did wrong;
in this paper, I retain the conventional use of “heaven” and thereby sacrifice some biblical
precision in terminology. All Bible quotations are from the NRSV translation.
5
Simon Kittle distinguishes five puzzles about free will in heaven in “Some Problems of
Heavenly Freedom.”
6
See Christopher Brown, “Making the Best Even Better”; Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe,
“Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven”; Pawl and Timpe “Heavenly Freedom”; Pawl
and Timpe, “Paradise and Growing in Virtue”; James Sennett, “Is There Freedom in Heaven?”;
Swinburne, “A Theodicy of Heaven and Hell”; Timpe, Free Will in Philosophical Theology.
7
This idea is similar to Harry Frankfurt’s concept of “volitional necessity” (“The
Importance of What We Care About,” 86) and Bernard Williams’s concept of “moral incapacity” (“Moral Incapacity,” 59).
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character—those actions enjoy indirect, inherited, or derived freedom
and moral praiseworthiness.8
Indirect freedom is genuine freedom. As Timothy O’Connor and
Christopher Franklin note,9 many philosophers characterize free will as
a kind of control or “up-to-meness” over choices or actions. These philosophers either identify the kind of control relevant to freedom as the
same kind of control relevant to being morally responsible for a choice,10
or, more strongly, they define freedom-relevant control in terms of
responsibility-relevant control over a choice.11 So, if a person is morally
responsible for the character that necessitates her choice, the necessitated
choice is up-to-her in a sense that is either to be identified with a kind of
free choice—namely, choosing from her own freely made will—or to be
defined as a free choice of some kind.12 On this analysis, indirect freedom
comes in degrees.13 A person acts with a greater degree of indirect freedom
if she has a greater degree of moral responsibility, praiseworthiness, or
blameworthiness for the character that ensures the action and transfers
these properties to it.
My aim in this paper is to explore further this view of indirect freedom
in heaven by examining the way in which character is perfected post-mortem, because at least most human persons do not have perfect character
at the time of their death. There are two general models of character perfection, and each is endorsed in passing by proponents of this account
of heavenly freedom. On the unilateral model of character perfection, God
unilaterally, and presumably instantaneously, perfects all that is deficient
in the character of human persons in their first moments of the afterlife.14
On the cooperative model of character perfection, God works together with
human persons by providing them with enabling grace to improve their
character through their own directly free actions and omissions until it
becomes perfect, and this process occurs gradually before death and plausibly also after death in purgatory.15 For the purposes of this paper, purgatory is a place of gradual sanctification or good character development,

8
For an account of indirectly free actions, see Hartman, “Indirectly Free Actions,
Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.”
9
O’Connor and Franklin, “Free Will.”
10
For example, Neil Levy, Hard Luck, 1; Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in
Life, 1–2; Saul Smilansky, Free Will and Illusion, 16.
11
For example, Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck, 17; Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason,
3–4.
12
For dissenting opinions about freedom being transferred in this way, see Matheson,
“Tracing and Heavenly Freedom,” 61–63; Kittle, “Heavenly Freedom, Derivative Freedom,
and the Value of Free Choices”; Peter van Inwagen, “When is the Will Free?” 418.
13
O’Connor argues that direct freedom also comes in degrees in “Degrees of Freedom.”
14
Sennett, “Is There Freedom in Heaven?” 77. On the unilateral model, perhaps
God brings about full sanctification at the moment just prior to death. For simplicity, I omit
this possibility.
15
Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 411n36.
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and it is not necessarily a place of satisfaction wherein a person receives
punishment or does penance for past wrongdoing.16
These models appear to have significant implications for which human
persons can have freedom in heaven and to what degree they can have
freedom. For example, it at least seems as though a person with overall
very bad character who accepts God’s invitation to salvation on her deathbed cannot act indirectly freely in heaven if God unilaterally remedies all
that is deficient in her character. But if heavenly freedom is a great good
and heaven is the best place or state for human beings, God would prefer
a means of character perfection that allows (i) all persons in heaven to
have free will and (ii) all persons in heaven to have a greater degree of
freedom, other things being equal. I appeal to these two considerations
about the universality and degree of heavenly freedom as assessment criteria against which to evaluate models of character perfection.17
In this paper, I argue that, on various assumptions, both the unilateral
and cooperative models of character perfection can allow for all human
persons in heaven to enjoy heavenly freedom, including the person in
the previously mentioned case of deathbed repentance; but I also argue
that the cooperative model allows all persons in heaven to enjoy a greater
degree of freedom with respect to their heavenly actions. Thus, we have
a preliminary reason to think that God would perfect human character in
the cooperative way.
I would like to qualify this argument in two ways. First, my argument
merely provides a reason for God to implement the cooperative model
rather than the unilateral model. Such a reason is compatible with the unilateral model’s promoting overall better moral goods for those in heaven
if there are other and better heavenly goods available or risk-free only on
the unilateral model. Such a reason is also compatible with the overall best
model’s being a mixed model, according to which some human persons are
perfected in the cooperative way and others are perfected in the unilateral
way. In this latter case, my argument is that God has a preliminary reason to
16
My project is consistent with purgatory as having the single purpose of sanctification
and as having the dual purpose of sanctification and satisfaction. Given that Protestants may
be reluctant to accept any form of purgatory, it is worth mentioning that Jerry Walls argues
that the sanctification version is consistent and consonant with the biblical data, even though
it is not taught in the Bible (Purgatory, 35–57). Walls also argues that Protestants should accept
the sanctification version of purgatory for an independent reason concerning personal identity (Purgatory, 93–122). Additionally, Joshua Thurow argues that Protestants should accept
a modified satisfaction version of purgatory with respect to repairing our interpersonal relationships with one another in preparation for heaven (“Atoning in Purgatory”).
17
If heavenly freedom is a very great good, persons of young age or with severe disabilities who cannot respond to God’s invitation to salvation in their pre-mortem lives may
have an opportunity to do so later. Kevin Timpe suggests that such persons may undergo
development or healing in “limbo” to allow them a broad range of first-time chances to freely
accept or resist God’s saving grace (“An Argument for Limbo”; for an objection, see David
Worsley, “Limbo, Hiddenness, and the Beatific Vision”). If such persons are saved in limbo,
their character can be perfected either unilaterally by God after limbo ends or cooperatively
in limbo and purgatory.
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choose the cooperative process as the default model of character perfection
and to employ the unilateral process in special cases. To avoid unnecessary
complications, I do not consider mixed models. My aim is not to argue for
an all-things-considered account of character perfection, but to examine the
way in which considerations about heavenly freedom may impact such an
account.
Second, my assessment criteria presuppose that heavenly freedom is
valuable in a way that God would want to promote it, but such a presupposition is contentious for reasons concerning the nature of divine
freedom as Wes Morriston forcefully argues.18 In particular, God’s perfect
goodness necessitates that God does what is best. This great-making feature of God rules out God’s having morally significant freedom, because
what is best for God to do is never what is morally wrong. But God’s
lacking morally significant freedom results in a dilemma: either morally
significant freedom is valuable due to its enabling great moral autonomy,
moral responsibility, moral self-creation, and moral difference-making in
the world (but God lacks this perfection), or morally significant freedom
is not valuable in these ways (and the free will defense fails). Since the
first horn of the dilemma is a reductio and the second horn contradicts
my starting point, my claim that indirect freedom in heaven is valuable
such that God would be concerned to promote it requires there to be a
way out of Morriston’s dilemma. The reply to which the assumptions in
this paper commit me is that morally significant freedom is valuable for
human beings but not for God, and so to deny the claim that God lacks a
perfection by failing to have morally significant freedom. Other philosophers have filled out such a reply.19 I put this issue aside and assume that
heavenly freedom is valuable in these ways.20
The Universality Criterion of Heavenly Freedom
Jenny is a person with overall bad character near the time of her death.
On her deathbed, her friend shares with her the good news of Jesus; Jenny
repents of her wrongdoing and trusts in Jesus as her Lord and Savior. She
dies quickly thereafter.

Morriston, “What Is So Good about Moral Freedom?” and “Is God Free?”
See O’Connor, “Freedom with a Human Face,” 213; Pawl and Timpe, “Heavenly
Freedom”; Alexander Pruss, “The Essential Divine-Perfection Objection to the Free-Will
Defense”; Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 185–205; Timpe, Free Will in Philosophical Theology,
103–118.
20
Some ways out of Morriston’s dilemma conflict with this assumption about the value
of freedom. For example, Joshua Rasmussen explores the idea that morally significant free
actions are valuable only because such freedom allows human beings to choose to love God
without God’s making them do so. If this is the sole value of morally significant freedom,
we have a plausible explanation for why such freedom is valuable in our pre-mortem lives,
why such freedom is not valuable in heaven, and why God lacks no perfection in failing to
have morally significant freedom—namely, God chooses to love human beings without their
making God do so (“On the Value of Freedom to Do Evil”).
18
19
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Suppose that the unilateral model is correct, and that Jenny’s overall
bad character is unilaterally transformed by God. Jenny thereby loses all
of her epistemic, affective, or behavioral dispositions toward wrongdoing,
and she gains character perfections that involve a vast array of true moral
beliefs, extremely strong dispositions for fitting emotional responses, and
extremely strong dispositions to act in ways that are good and right. It is,
then, hard to see how Jenny could act indirectly freely in heaven. That is,
because Jenny’s perfected character is God’s own doing, it is hard to see
how her character could transfer freedom and moral responsibility from
her pre-heaven morally significant free actions to her heavenly actions.
One might think that we can make sense of Jenny’s heavenly freedom by pointing to her pre-conversion morally significant free actions.
Possibly, prior to her repentance, she performed many morally significant
free actions that contributed in part to the formation of all her heavenly
virtues that God unilaterally perfects. In this way, Jenny freely forms part
of her character, and these contributions can themselves be the source of
her meager indirect freedom in heaven.
But even if it is possible for Jenny to perform pre-conversion morally
significant free actions and omissions that contribute to her character and
that partially form her heavenly virtues,21 we can stipulate that these possibilities are not actualized. Perhaps Jenny is young and lacks the relevant
opportunities. Or perhaps she had the opportunities, but she misused her
morally significant freedom in such cases, which implies that she has not
made the right kind of contribution to her character to add to her heavenly virtues. Or perhaps she had the opportunities and used her morally
significant freedom in the right kinds of ways to contribute to her heavenly character, but she was wholly ignorant about the way in which those
actions formed her character, which precludes her from being morally
responsible for those parts of her dispositions. Or perhaps she used her
morally significant freedom in the right way to be morally responsible for
her contribution to her heavenly character, but she later suffered a kind
of severe psychic trauma that dislodged and fragmented those character
traits. Stipulations such as these ensure that this puzzle is not avoided in
this way.22
The universality of heavenly freedom criterion is that God has a reason to
prefer a model of character perfection that allows all human persons in
heaven to enjoy indirect freedom to a model that does not. The unilateral model appears to rule out some people’s having free will in heaven,
There is a potential worry for Jenny’s contributing to her heavenly character prior to
her conversion relating to infused virtues. If the true virtues in heaven are wholly infused by
God at conversion and are not completed Aristotle-style virtues, Jenny would not be able to
contribute to her heavenly virtues via her pre-conversion morally significant free actions. See
Eleonore Stump, “The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics.”
22
One strategy for reply is to insist that this stipulation is illegitimate. Perhaps God is able
to ensure that every actualized person in Jenny’s condition finds themselves in pre-conversion circumstances in which they freely contribute to their character in the right way.
21
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because it seems to rule out Jenny’s having free will in heaven. In contrast, Jenny’s case is no obstacle for the cooperative model’s allowing all
persons in heaven to enjoy indirect freedom, because Jenny can perform
many directly free actions and omissions via divine assistance in purgatory that eventually come to form her heavenly virtues. Thus, the universality criterion appears to provide a reason for God to implement the
cooperative model rather than the unilateral model.
I contend, however, that the universality criterion does not favor the
cooperative model in cases such as Jenny’s, because both models can
make sense of such persons enjoying free will in heaven. In particular, if
cooperatively perfected virtues can preserve freedom in heaven, the same
is true for unilaterally perfected virtues on various assumptions, because
the relevant moral differences between these processes of virtue perfection is one of degree, not kind. My argument for this conditional claim is
based on two features these processes share. First, both modes of virtue
formation partially are gifts, because a person’s acquiring cooperatively
or unilaterally perfected virtues is not solely her own doing and not solely
the doing of others.23 Second, in both modes of virtue formation, persons
can be morally praiseworthy for acquiring the virtues. Clearly, human
persons are morally praiseworthy for acquiring cooperatively perfected
virtues via their own directly free actions and omissions, and, obviously,
unilaterally perfected virtues are gifts from God.
My task is to show that cooperatively perfected virtues are gifts, and
that human persons are morally praiseworthy for their unilaterally perfected virtues.
On the one hand, cooperatively perfected virtues are “gifts” from those
in our interpersonal relationships and surrounding communities;24 as
Aristotle claims, we are jointly responsible for our states of character.25
Our various communities play a large role in our development of moral
virtues through preliminary moral education and desire habitation; that
is, they bestow to us a large number of our true moral beliefs and they
condition our desires away from many bad things and toward many good
things. Additionally, our communities play a large role in directing our
aspirations and self-cultivations by offering role models to admire; they
provide many forward-looking praising and blaming practices to help
reinforce our commitment to moral norms; and we tend to become like
the people with whom we have relational union.26 At the very least, our
communities must not preclude virtue development. Think, for example,
One obvious difference is that God is the immediate efficient cause of final virtue on the
unilateral model but not on the cooperative model. My argument will be that this is a morally relevant difference only with respect to degree of moral responsibility for virtue—and
not whether someone is morally responsible for virtue.
24
Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue, 165.
25
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1114b20.
26
Stump, “The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics,” 38; see also 1 Corinthians
15:33; Proverbs 27:17.
23
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of communities rearing child soldiers that use fear tactics, moral desensitization, and addiction to drugs and the pleasures of power to make manipulable soldiers; for many such persons, developing virtue is out of reach.27
Thus, minimally decent human communities turn out to be something
close to a necessary condition for virtue cultivation, and at least most of
our communities provide enormous help in cultivating moral virtues to
some degree through moral education, desire habituation, role models,
moral encouragement and reproach, and relational shaping.
Additionally, God provides common grace that inclines all persons
to develop virtue, for example, by forming in them a conscience and by
establishing government to restrain human evils;28 and God provides
special helping grace to develop virtue to those united to God’s self in a
morally transformative relationship, for example, by relational shaping
and nudging via the indwelling Holy Spirit.29 Thus, our cooperatively perfected virtues are gifts from others due to the way in which we get help
from them for the raw materials for virtue and throughout the process of
virtue formation.
On the other hand, human persons can be morally praiseworthy to some
degree for their unilaterally perfected virtues if divine and human agency
are both involved in the right way with respect to the human person’s
coming to faith. This claim requires some background and motivating.
The background is that apart from God’s enabling grace, human beings
cannot themselves accept or cease rejecting God’s invitation to salvation;
such actions and omissions are not among their alternative possibilities.
But according to theological views consonant with my starting assumptions about libertarian freedom, God does provide all human beings with
prevenient or preparatory grace that expands the option range of their
libertarian freedom thereby allowing them either to accept God’s saving
grace or to cease resisting it. So, Jenny’s coming to faith is enabled and
prompted by God’s grace, but her actually coming to faith must involve
her own directly free action or omission.30 Human persons, then, can be
morally praiseworthy to some degree for being in relationship with God,
because their freely accepting God’s saving grace or ceasing to resist it is
a morally good state of affairs; and their doing so is difficult owing to the
strong human propensity to resist love’s relational demands. Analogously,
an addict is morally praiseworthy for freely surrendering to her family’s
demands that she quit drinking alcohol, because this movement of her
27
Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, 125; Adams,
A Theory of Virtue, 163; Hartman, “Moral Luck and the Unfairness of Morality,” 3195.
28
Romans 2:13–15, 13:1–7.
29
See William Alston, “The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit.”
30
It is because God’s grace initiates and enables Jenny’s accepting or not refusing
God’s saving grace that my claim is not Pelagian as defined by The Council of Orange in 529.
See Richard Cross, “Anti-Pelagianism and the Resistibility of Grace.”
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free will is morally good, difficult, and contrasts with other worse possible
movements.
If human persons can be morally praiseworthy to some degree for
entering into relationship with God, they can be morally praiseworthy
to some degree for their character perfection if such perfection is a consequence that they could reasonably be expected to foresee in at least its
general outlines.31 And a person’s character perfection is a foreseeable
result at least in its general outlines of beginning a morally transforming
relationship with God. After all, such a relationship can begin only after
a person feels contrite to some degree about her wrongdoing, repents of
her wrongdoing at least to some degree, and trusts in God as her Lord
and Savior to guide her future. By analogy, if a person freely decides to
take the virtue pill, takes the pill, becomes virtuous, and can reasonably
be expected to foresee herself becoming so as a result of taking it, she can
be morally praiseworthy to some degree for becoming virtuous in this
way.32 Thus, a person can be morally praiseworthy to some degree for her
unilaterally perfected virtues.
One might object that allowing persons to be praiseworthy to some
degree for being in a saving relationship with God contravenes Ephesians
2:8–9 (“For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not
your own doing; it is the gift of God—not the result of works, so that no
one may boast”) by providing a ground for pride and boasting.
Two considerations, I think, defuse this objection. First, there is not
much to take pride in or boast about for human persons, because most of
the moral praiseworthiness for a human person’s being in a saving relationship with God accrues to God’s self. After all, human beings were in
a dreadful state, human beings cannot themselves fix their horrible state,
God sacrifices to save them, God gives them enabling grace to respond
positively to his invitation to salvation, and human beings merely accept
God’s invitation to salvation or perhaps merely stop resisting God’s grace.
Second, even if human beings are praiseworthy to some limited degree for
their being in relationship with God, it may not be permissible for them to
praise themselves, because there is an ethics of praising the praiseworthy;
that is, a person’s being praiseworthy is not sufficient for its being permissible to praise her. And it seems at least bad if not morally wrong for
Jenny overtly to praise herself for her own meager contribution, because it
is ungrateful in light of what God has done. Here is an analogy: Jim slips
and falls down the side of a cliff onto a slender ledge. Samantha comes
along with some rope, sends the rope down to Jim, and she pulls him up.
Subsequently, Jim praises himself for his own life-saving actions; he did,
See Hartman, “Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck,”
1426–1431; cf. John Martin Fischer and Neal A. Tognazzini, “The Truth About Tracing”;
Timpe, “Tracing and the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.”
32
Hartman, “Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck,”
1422–1423.
31
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after all, hold onto the rope! In praising himself, Jim at least acts badly,
and perhaps also acts wrongly. The proper private and overt responses
are gratitude and humility for the salvation primarily brought about
by others.
If the responses about meager praiseworthiness and the ethics of praising do not defeat the objection because, for example, the right view of a
human person’s coming to faith involves only God’s agency, then Jenny
cannot act indirectly freely in heaven.33 In that case, the universality criterion would favor the cooperative model over the unilateral model if the
cooperative model can make sense of heavenly freedom for agents who
are not morally responsible for their being in a morally transformative
relationship with God. The cooperative model can do so. After all, even if
a person is not morally responsible in any way for her coming to faith and
is thereby not morally responsible for the particular parts of her character
that were unilaterally transformed by God at conversion, she can still perform morally significant free actions and omissions in her pre-heaven life
that are motivated by parts of her character for which she is not morally
responsible.34 This claim is true in part because it is not the case that a
person acts directly freely only if she is morally responsible for the character that explains her action.35 Thus, Jenny can act indirectly freely in
heaven on the cooperative model even if she is not morally responsible for
being in a morally transformative relationship with God, because she can
use her morally significant freedom in post-conversion but pre-heavenly
opportunities to contribute to her heavenly character. In that case, the universality criterion would favor the cooperative model.
In summary, if cooperatively perfected virtues can ground indirect freedom in heaven, unilaterally perfected virtues can too on various assumptions, because both cooperatively and unilaterally perfected virtues are
gifts to some degree for which human beings are morally praiseworthy to
some degree. Contrary to appearances, we should not think that the universality criterion favors the cooperative model over the unilateral model
in cases such as Jenny’s if agents can be morally praiseworthy to some
degree for being in a saving relationship with God and that relationship
foreseeably results in the agent’s character being perfected.

The same is true, for example, if Jenny is not morally praiseworthy for her perfected
character due to another reason such as her perfected character was not a foreseeable consequence of entering into a morally transformative relationship with God. This epistemic obstacle is not a problem for developing moral responsibility for character in purgatory on the
cooperative model, and so this potential problem is uniquely faced by the unilateral model.
34
Even on the cooperative model of character perfection, some parts of the agent’s character are unilaterally transformed by God; this is the idea from 2 Corinthians 5:17 that a newly
converted person has become a new creation or has new character that begins the character
perfection process. Cf. Stump, Atonement, 203–206.
35
For arguments on behalf of the partial explanation, see Hartman, “Constitutive
Moral Luck and Strawson’s Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.”
33
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The Degree Criterion of Heavenly Freedom
Tammy is someone who trusts Jesus as her Lord and Savior and lives a
long time before she dies; by God’s enabling grace and her impressive
moral effort, Tammy makes serious moral progress before death. In this
way, Tammy performs many pre-mortem morally significant free choices
that contribute to some great degree to the goodness of her character.
Thus, Tammy has more greatly contributed to her perfected character via
morally significant free actions than Jenny has contributed in that way to
hers. Intuitively, the more a person contributes to her good character via
exercises of morally significant freedom, the more morally praiseworthy
she is for her good character and the actions that deterministically result
from it.36 Thus, strictly based on Tammy and Jenny’s pre-mortem morally significant free actions, Tammy is far more morally praiseworthy for
her perfect character than Jenny is for her perfect character. So, if God
employs the unilateral model of character perfection, Tammy would have
a much greater degree of indirect freedom in heaven.
The degree of heavenly freedom criterion is that God has a reason to prefer a
model of character perfection that allows all human persons in heaven to
have a greater degree of indirect freedom over a model that enables them
to have a lesser degree. The perfected character of persons in heaven is
much more of their own doing via pre-heavenly morally significantly free
choices on the cooperative model than on the unilateral model, because
the cooperative model allows many more morally significant free actions
and omissions to have a substantive role in forming the agent’s heavenly virtues after death in purgatory, especially in Jenny’s case. Thus, all
human persons in heaven enjoy a far greater degree of indirect freedom
on the cooperative model than on the unilateral model, and the degree
criterion provides a reason to think that God would implement the
cooperative model.
One might reject the degree criterion as implausible, because one might
think that acting with a greater degree of indirect freedom in heaven does
not matter.
But acting with a greater degree of indirect freedom in heaven does matter given the animating assumption of this paper—namely, that morally
significant freedom is valuable in our pre-mortem lives at least because it
enables serious moral autonomy, moral responsibility, and moral self-creation. These value claims strike many philosophers and theologians as intuitively plausible, which partially explains the popularity of the free will
defense. And if these value claims are true about our pre-heavenly lives,
See Hartman, “Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck,”
1431–1433; Kane, “Three Freedoms, Free Will, and Self-Formation.” It is worth noting that
Brian Boeninger and Robert Garcia suggest that the kind of resultant moral luck involved in
heavenly free actions is problematic (“Resting on Your Laurels,” 304–307) and that I argue
elsewhere that this kind of moral luck is not problematic in general (In Defense of Moral Luck,
105–111, 124–138).
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they are also true about our lives in heaven, because morality is continuous
between earth and heaven. Plausibly, the more of these valuable features
that are appropriated in a person’s will, the better; as Richard Swinburne
writes, “If responsibility is a good thing, then . . . the more of it the better.”37
One might also doubt that the degree criterion favors the cooperative
model, because one might think that it is possible for Jenny and Tammy
to become more morally praiseworthy for their character via directly free
actions while they are in heaven. In a series of papers, Timothy Pawl and
Kevin Timpe explicate a view in this neighborhood.38 Put in the terminology of this paper, their view is that persons in heaven act indirectly
freely when their perfected character for which they are morally responsible determines their action, and persons in heaven act directly freely
when their perfected character for which they are morally responsible
precludes wrongdoing but still leaves open various alternative choices.39
Importantly, such directly free actions are not morally significant, because
no alternative choice is morally wrong. Even so, they are “morally relevant”
if and only if some of the alternatives are non-trivially morally better than
others.40 Morally relevant choices have moral weight in part by improving heavenly character.41 Whatever the differences in praiseworthiness for

Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, 97. Additionally, greater indirect freedom
in heaven is conducive to greater flourishing. For Aquinas, different persons in heaven enjoy
different degrees of flourishing (Summa Theologiae, I–II 5.2). As Eleonore Stump develops that
idea, the difference between two morally perfected persons who are enjoying different degrees
of flourishing in heaven is determined by differences in their willingness, and thus their capacity, to receive God’s love and goodness; neither lacks any goodness that they currently have
a capacity to receive, because both persons fully flourish relative to their capacities to desire
God and his goodness (Wandering in Darkness, 390–391). Jenny on the unilateral model would
not have cultivated as great a capacity to desire God’s love and goodness as Tammy, because
Tammy has a deeper and closer relationship with God via many more instances of her freely
willing to experience more of God’s love and goodness. If it is possible to will for more of God’s
goodness in heaven and thus increase one’s capacity to experience God in heaven, they both
may ever increase in flourishing; but Tammy may always flourish more.
38
Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” “Heavenly
Freedom,” and “Paradise and Growing in Virtue.”
39
Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 408, 410, 414–415.
40
Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 416. Additionally,
Pawl and Timpe assert that the good alternatives are supererogatory. But it is not obvious to
me that there are moral obligations in heaven, and so I describe their view merely in reference to good options.
41
Pawl and Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 418; “Paradise and
Growing in Virtue,” 98. Heavenly character does not improve in the sense of acquiring new
virtues or acting more on the virtuous mean. It may be improved in the sense of “clinging
ever tighter to the [virtuous] mean,” because there may be no upper limit for growing in
their love of the good. This seems right. After all, character just is or supervenes on a person’s thick and stable beliefs and desires in a way that reflects well or badly on the person
(cf. Christian Miller, Character and Moral Psychology, 24–35). And persons in heaven plausibly
discover new truths regularly about God and goodness, and thereby often form additional
true beliefs, that make them love God and goodness even more, and thereby form additional
good desires; all of these changes reflect well on the person.
37
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character are between Jenny and Tammy when they enter heaven, such differences may eventually be swallowed up by morally relevant free actions
in heaven that form new character and that generate new direct moral
praiseworthiness. Thus, if Pawl and Timpe’s basic proposal is plausible
and if the additional claim that morally relevant free actions generate direct
moral praiseworthiness is also plausible,42 the degree criterion may not
favor the cooperative model, because morally relevant free actions would
generate new moral praiseworthiness for character in heaven that would
eventually make negligible the moral praiseworthiness for her character
generated by pre-heavenly morally significant free actions.
But this objection inspired by Pawl and Timpe’s proposal is implausible, because there are good reasons to think that human persons cannot
act with morally relevant freedom in heaven. My argument for the claim
that no human person in heaven exercises morally relevant freedom concerns the nature of the choice options and the nature of perfect character.
Consider a circumstance with various choice options one of which is
morally best. In that circumstance, a morally perfect person must choose
the morally best option. After all, better moral character disposes a person
to choose the better moral option, and so perfect character recommends the
morally best option; and because perfect character also involves extremely
strong dispositions to act in ways that are right and good, perfect character necessitates choosing the morally best. This reasoning is commonly
used to support the idea that God’s perfect character necessitates that God
chooses what is morally best.43 Likewise, human persons in heaven must
choose the morally best option if they know which option is morally best,
because their moral character is perfect. If, however, human beings in
heaven are ignorant of some of the moral properties of their options, they

In the case of morally relevant free actions, I find it intuitive that the agent is morally
praiseworthy for choosing the better option. Although Matheson disagrees (“Tracing and
Heavenly Freedom,” 63–65), Swinburne agrees (Providence and the Problem of Evil, 84–90).
One might think that this intuition’s being correct would obviously undermine the value of
the morally significant freedom and the free will defense. After all, God could have initially
created a world of human beings with very good character leaving room only for morally relevant free choices between options that are not morally wrong, which would allow them to
be directly morally praiseworthy to some degree and yet rule out the possibility of choosing
a morally wrong option. But these claims do not obviously undermine the value of morally
significant freedom or the free will defense. It is plausible that the degree of an agent’s direct
moral praiseworthiness for morally relevant free actions would be slight in comparison with
direct moral praiseworthiness for morally significant free actions. Thus, if God had initially
created a world of human beings with very good character in this way, there would be precious little scope for moral autonomy, moral responsibility, moral self-creation, and moral
difference-making in the world. Perhaps a far more serious scope for all of the valuable
features is part of a good explanation why for God would confer morally significant freedom
to human beings.
43
See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy, 227; Morriston, “What Is So Good about Moral
Freedom?” and “Is God Free?”; O’Connor, “Freedom with a Human Face,” 212; William
Rowe, “Can God Be Free?” 409–410; Swinburne, “The Social Theory of the Trinity,” 427.
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must be inculpably ignorant; and their perfect character would necessitate
their choosing the option that appears morally best to them.
But that single option set rules out morally relevant freedom. After all,
morally relevant freedom requires alternative possibilities at the moment
of choice, and perfect character rules out all of the less-than-best choice
options as possibilities.
Might there be room for morally relevant freedom in heavenly circumstances in which there is no non-trivially morally best option? There
are only two possible kinds of such circumstances, and I contend neither
offers a plausible occasion to act with morally relevant freedom in heaven.
First, a circumstance provides no non-trivially morally best option if
all the choice options are exactly equally morally valuable or incommensurably morally valuable.44 Plausibly, the same is true for options that are
trivially unequally morally valuable such that their moral differences are
so tiny that they generate no qualitatively different reasons in the perfectly virtuous agent in comparison with exactly equally morally valuable
options. For each of these sets of options, a heavenly person’s virtuous
reasons leave open which of those choices to make, and thereby create an
opportunity to exercise direct freedom.
But those sets of options also rule out morally relevant freedom, because
no alternative possibility is non-trivially morally better than another and
morally relevant freedom requires that at least one option is non-trivially
morally better than another.45
Second, a circumstance provides no non-trivially morally best choice
option if there is an infinite number of morally good alternatives to choose
between, and, for any good option, there is a non-trivially morally better
one. Such circumstances satisfy the basic constraints for exercising morally
relevant freedom in heaven, because there is more than one alternative
possibility at the moment of choice and at least one of those alternative
possibilities is non-trivially morally better than another. Plausibly, a perfectly virtuous person could choose a morally inferior option in such a
44
It is not possible for persons in heaven to have an option set in which there is no non-trivially morally best option but where some are better than others. For example, suppose there
is an apparent option range (i)–(iii) where (i) and (ii) are equally morally valuable, and each
is better than (iii). According to this set up, a person with perfect character must choose (i) or
(ii), and so (iii) is not a genuine option.
45
This stage of my argument crucially relies on the interpretation of Pawl and Timpe as
measuring the moral goodness of actions under a single hierarchy. But what if we understand morally relevant actions as choosing between options that are morally incommensurable due to their developing different kinds of goodness? In that case, one option would be
morally better in some way than another. I thank Tim Pawl and Mark Murphy for pressing
this alternative interpretation. Nevertheless, this alternative interpretation offers no help for
acquiring direct moral praiseworthiness in heaven, because a person is not directly morally
praiseworthy for a choice between overall incommensurably good options in the case that
their character requires that they must choose between only those options. Of course, such a
person could be indirectly morally praiseworthy for choosing one of these incommensurable
good options if she is morally praiseworthy for the character that limits her choice range in
this way. See footnote 42 for a related point.
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case, because all choices in this circumstance necessarily have that comparative property.46
But it seems plausible that human persons cannot find themselves in a
heavenly circumstance with an infinite number of choice options at a particular time. After all, pre-mortem human persons are in material conditions
that limit their options to a finite set and their volitional capacities afford
them the ability to do only a finite number of things. Plausibly, the same is
true for morally perfected human persons in heaven, because such persons
enjoy an embodied mode of existence in the afterlife on the new earth,47 and,
plausibly, they do not leave behind their finite volitional capacities.
One might object that human beings in heaven do at least have infinite
lifespans, and so it is possible for them to have a diachronic infinite option
set, according to which an infinite number of choice options are staggered
over time and increase in value.48 Suppose, for example, there is a bottle of
wine that gets better each day ad infinitum,49 and breaking open this bottle
with friends in heaven increases in moral value each day due to the better
quality of hospitality it provides for guests. The option set, then, would
include the following directly free choices: (i) to open the bottle today, (ii)
to open the bottle tomorrow, or (n) to open the bottle tomorrow + n.50 In
the case of a directly free choice made today to open the bottle on a future
day such as (ii), the future action would be ensured or necessitated in such
a way as to count as an indirectly free action.
But there is a separate reason related to finitude about why human
beings in heaven cannot have an infinite number of choice options.
Plausibly, the infinity of possibilities would not be cognizable at a particular time, because pre-mortem and heavenly human persons have only
finite and limited cognitive capacities. So, only a finite cognizable number of options would remain. As such, the person in heaven would have
only a finite set of options to exercise direct freedom, because options to
exercise direct freedom are limited to the possibilities that are presented
by her intellect to the will. But then, given the options that her intellect
presents to her will at a particular time, her perfect character must lead
her to choose to open the bottle of wine on the day that is most morally
valuable of all the days presently cognized, or to choose to exercise her
intellect further to expand her option range. Plausibly, it would be best at
some point to directly freely choose to open the bottle on a particular day
rather than to further exercise her cognitive powers, because it is better to
46
Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder, “How an Unsurpassable Being Can Create a
Surpassable World.”
47
See 1 Corinthians 15; Revelation 21–22.
48
I owe this objection to Mark Murphy.
49
John Pollock, “How Do You Maximize Expected Value?” 417.
50
An irrelevant option construal is between (i) opening the bottle today or (ii) saving the
bottle for another day, because this is a potentially infinite series of finite sets of options.
By directly freely choosing (ii) today, I get a new option set tomorrow, again, between (i)
and (ii).
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open the bottle at some point rather than never to open the bottle at all;
and any day on which she chooses to open the bottle necessarily has the
property of being morally inferior to some future day. For these reasons,
the heavenly person would not be flummoxed by such a choice. Therefore,
if the intellectual powers of perfected human persons remain finite, the
diachronically infinite set of possibilities provides no occasion for morally
relevant freedom either.51
In summary, it is implausible that people act with morally relevant freedom in heaven. Heavenly circumstances offer only sets of options either
with finite members or finite cognizable members at a particular time. If
there is a unique non-trivially morally best alternative among the finite
option set, the perfected person must choose that option, and so lacks alternative possibilities and thereby lacks morally relevant freedom. If there is
no unique non-trivially morally best alternative among the finite option
set, all the choice options are exactly equally morally valuable, trivially
unequally morally valuable, or incommensurably morally valuable, but
no such option is non-trivially morally better than another, which rules
out morally relevant freedom. Thus, perfected human beings in heaven
cannot act with morally relevant freedom.
This argument has a constructive implication about the nature of moral
praiseworthiness for heavenly free actions. All heavenly actions either are
indirectly free choices determined by perfect character or are directly free
choices made between options that are equally morally valuable, trivially unequally morally valuable, or incommensurably morally valuable.
Indirectly free choices in heaven do not generate new direct moral praiseworthiness, and directly free choices in heaven made between option sets
of those three kinds plausibly do not generate new direct moral praiseworthiness either. Thus, all moral praiseworthiness for a person’s indirectly
and directly free actions in heaven is inherited from her pre-heavenly
morally significant and relevant free actions.
Therefore, both objections to the claim that the degree criterion favors
the cooperative model are defeated. And since there are no other obvious
objections to that claim, I conclude that the degree criterion favors the
cooperative model of character perfection.
Conclusion
I assessed two models of character perfection based on the idea that God
would want to promote free will in heaven. Although the universality
criterion appeared to support the cooperative model over the unilateral
model in cases such as Jenny’s, I argued that this appearance is misleading; both models can make sense of the idea that all human persons in
heaven possess indirect freedom if agents can be praiseworthy for being in
51
My argument is compatible with Swinburne’s plausible speculation that the redeemed
in heaven have “much increased” cognitive and volitional capacities (Responsibility and
Atonement, 190). My argument requires only that these capacities remain finite.
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a saving relationship with God and their character perfection is a foreseeable consequence of beginning such a morally transformative relationship.
(If I am wrong that human persons are praiseworthy for entering into a
morally transformative relationship with God or that character perfection
is a foreseeable result of being in that kind of relationship, the universality criterion does favor the cooperative model.) Subsequently, I argued
that the degree criterion supports the cooperative model over the unilateral model, because it allows all persons—and especially persons such
as Jenny—to enjoy a greater degree of indirect freedom in heaven. Thus,
assuming that heavenly freedom is valuable in a way that God would be
concerned to promote it, we have a reason to think that God would perfect
human character according to the cooperative model.
Two constructive claims about the afterlife follow. First, all moral praiseworthiness for heavenly actions derive from pre-heavenly morally significant and relevant free actions. Second, the cooperative model requires that
the character perfection process continues after death, and so my argument
provides a reason to affirm purgatory as a place of character development.
These considerations about heavenly freedom offered in support of
the cooperative model are not decisive on their own, even apart from my
undefended assumption about the value of heavenly freedom. Heavenly
freedom is merely one kind of good that God would take into account
when deciding between models of character perfection. Perhaps alternative goods are available or risk-free only on the unilateral model, and
such goods may make the unilateral model morally preferable overall;52 or
perhaps an all-things-considered assessment of heavenly goods favors a
mixed model. In this way, my argument is not a decisive argument for an
unmixed cooperative model; it just provides a reason in favor of thinking
that God would want to perfect the character of redeemed persons in the
cooperative way, other things being equal.53
Stockholm University
52
For example, salvation secured in the pre-mortem life becomes risky to some degree
on the cooperative model if persons in purgatory can defect from their saving relationship
with God (Green, “The Jet Leg Theory of Purgatory,” 153–154; cf. Walls, Purgatory, 147–149).
It is also logically possible that a person remains forever in purgatory; I thank Mark Murphy
for that related point. One might think that such considerations are sufficient to condemn
the cooperative model. But they are not, because there are other points of which we should
take stock. For example, if personal identity cannot survive the dramatic transformation in
character on the unilateral model, no merely human person who is saved makes it to heaven
on the unilateral model, which would be a compelling argument for the cooperative model
despite the previously mentioned risks (cf. Walls, Purgatory, 93–122).
53
I am indebted to Ray Baker, William Bülow, Everett Fulmer, Hillary Hartman, Ben
Matheson, Tim Pawl, and David Worsley as well as to Mark Murphy and two anonymous
referees for comments on some version of this paper. I am also grateful for comments and
objections from audiences at the 2020 Helsinki Analytic Theology Workshop at the University
of Helsinki, the 2020 Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, and
the 2020 meeting of the St. Benedict Society for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical
Theology at the University of York.
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